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Criminal Law-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTES PERMITTING IMPRISONMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF PROSECUTION COSTS AND THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT. Having served his sentence on a conviction for nine counts of statutory burglary, the indigent defendant,

Wright, was further confined solely for his failure to pay the costs of
his criminal prosecution. In accordance with a Virginia statute,' de-

fendant's confinement was extended approximately three years or until these costs were paid. In a habeas corpus proceeding, 3 petitioner
maintained that the confinement for nonpayment of costs was a violation of the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
which prohibits involuntary servitude except as a punishment for a
crime.4 Since costs are not a part of the punishment for a crime in
Virginia, 5 petitioner contended that such imprisonment was unconstitutional.

In issuing the writ of habeas corpus, the Virginia Supreme Court of
1. VA. CODE ANN. tit. 53 § 221 (1967 Repl. vol.):
Every person held to labor in the State convict road force, or in a chain
gang, or State farm, or State Industrial Farm for Women, for the nonpayment of fine and costs, shall be entitled to a credit on such fine and
costs, or costs, of seventy-five cents for each day he shall work, and of
twenty-five cents for each other day of confinement ....

The prisoner

shall work out the fine and costs, or costs, and shall thereupon be discharged from custody, provided no person shall be held for the nonpayment
of fine and costs, or costs, in the State convict road force, chain gang,
State farm, or State Industrial Farm for Women for a longer period than
six calendar months, although the credit due shall not discharge the fine
and costs, or costs, in full.
2. The court applied the statute to Wright's total costs of $1064.75, allowing $1 for
each day of imprisonment.
3. Wright v. Matthews, 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968).
4. U. S. CoNsr. amend. XIII, § 1:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944); U.S. v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149
(1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 233-34 (1911).
5. Ex parte Wilson, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 575, 183 N.E.2d 625 (1962); Commonwealth v.
McCue, 109 Va. 302, 304, 63 S.E. 1066, 1067 (1909) where the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia stated:
Payment of costs is no part of the sentence of the court, and constitutes
no part of the penalty or punishment prescribed for the offense. Indeed
our statute expressly declares that the laws of costs are not to be interpreted
as penal laws; they are to be construed as remedial statutes .....
See Anglea v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (10 Grat.) 696, 701 (1853).
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for nonpayment of costs
Appeals held that the defendant's incarceration
6
was contrary to the thirteenth amendment.
While at common law costs were not assessed against a convicted defendant in a criminal prosecution,7 they have since been imposed by

statutory provisions.8 The statutes vary as to the liability imposed for
these costs and the method by which they are enforced.' In Virginia, a
defendant who is unable to pay such costs is imprisoned until they are

paid or are waived by statutory provision.' 0
Statutes allowing for such imprisonment have been challenged on
several constitutional grounds. The most frequent basis for attack has
been that incarceration for nonpayment of costs violates state con-

stitutional mandates against imprisonment for debt." By and large,
courts have not found this argument convincing, declaring this constitutional safeguard applicable to contract debts and not to penalties

imposed by the punitive powers of the law.1 2 It has also been argued
6. Wright v. Matthews, 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968).
7. Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 85 (1896); Saunders v. People, 63 Colo. 241, 165 P.
781, 782 (1917); see generally 17 VANEt. L. REv. 1572 (1964).
8. Cramer v. Smith, 350 Mo. 736, 739, 168 S.W.2d 1039, 1040 (1943). Six states that do
not assess a convicted defendant with prosecution costs are: California, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York. VAm L. REv., supra note 7
at 1572 n.3.
9. 17 VANE. L. Rav., supra note 7 at 1572-74 (1964). Eight states have either no
statutory provision for assessing costs or specifically exempt the convicted defendant
from the liability for such costs. Several states exempt the indigent from assessment of
cost and the irhprisonment for nonpayment thereof. Eleven states, including Virginia,
allow the trial judge discretion in assessing costs to the criminal defendant.
10. VA. CODE AwN. tit. 53, § 221 (1967 Repl. vol). The code provides that persons
held at the State farm for nonpayment of costs are credited with one dollar per day
with a maximum of six months confinement for each offense.
11. Oklahoma and Wyoming have typical constitutional provisions. OKA. CONSr.
art. 2, § 13 (1952):
Imprisonment for debt is prohibited, except for the non-payment of fines
and penalties imposed for the violation of law.
Wyo. CoNsr. art. 1, § 5 (1959): "No person shall be imprisoned for debt except in
the case of fraud."
12. Ex parte Morris, 171 Okla. Crim. 499, 352 S.W.2d 125, 128 (1961), where the
court said:
It is elemental in criminal law that the provisions of our State Constitution
prohibiting imprisonment for debt has no application to criminal proceedings nor to imprisonment meted out as a punishment for violation of
the law, and that costs accruing under criminal prosecution and conviction
are not a debt within the meaning of Article I, Section 18, Constitution
of Texas, which provides: "No person shall ever be imprisoned for debt'
In Colby v. Backus, 19 Wash. 347, 53 P. 367 (1898), the court viewed the subject of
costs, saying:
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that these statutes violate due process of law, 13 impose cruel and unusual punishment, 14 deny equal protection of the law, 5 and violate
the right to trial by jury. 16
. The principal case provides a new means with which to challenge
the constitutionality of statutes that allow incarceration if a convicted
These costs are cast upon him as a penalty. They do not constitute strictly
and simply a debt, in the technical sense of the word, any more than the
fine imposed upon a party convicted of assault and battery is a debt.
See Lavender v. Tuscaloosa, 29 Ala. App. 502, 198 So. 459 (1940); Lee v. State, 75
Ala. 29 (1883); Ex parte John Hardy, 68 Ala. 303 (1880); Caldwell v. State, 55 Ala.
133 (1876); Morgan v. State, 47 Ala. 34 (1872); State v. Montroy, 37 Idaho 684, 217 P.
611, 613 (1923); Kenndy v. People, 122 Ill.
649, 13 N.E. 213 (1887); State v. Kilmer,
31 N.D. 442, 153 N.W. 1089 (1915); Ex parte Barnes, 67 Okla. Crim. 235, 93 P.2d 765
(1939).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; ....
The Court held in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), that a Pennsylvania
statute, which allowed the jury to assess costs of prosecution against the defendant
even though they found him innocent of the crime, was invalid under the due process
clause, because of its vagueness.
In another case constitutional rights became an issue where the criminal trial lingered
on and the number of witnesses mounted until the final costs assessed against the defendant became disproportionate to the crime. Had the defendant been unable to pay
the nine hundred dollars cost, he would have been confined for an additional two and
one half years. Arnold v. State, 76 Wyo. 445, 306 P.2d 368 (1957). See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: 'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." In Ex parte Smith, 110 Tex. Cr.
R. 335, 8 S.W.2d 139 (1928), a statute which did not allow for a specified rate at
which to work off costs while incarcerated was held unconstitutional as a cruel and
unusual punishment since the defendant would be kept in jail a lifetime.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1:
"... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
In Dillehey v. White, 264 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), the Court invalidated a
Tennessee imprisonment for nonpayment of costs statute on the ground that it violated
the equal protection clause because an indigent, unable to post bond, was required
to work off his jail fees plus the sentence while a rich person, able to post bond,
would never incur these costs.
16. US. CoNsv. amend. VI:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury ......
The court in Arnold v. State, 76 Wyo. 445, 306 P.2d 368 (1957), held that costs of
a jury trial became so great that the indigent, who must work off these costs, is
deterred from pleading innocent. See also Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 347, 134 P. 260
(1913).
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defendant is unable to pay his prosecution costs. Previous constitutional
attacks have depended upon nebulous interpretations of such far-reaching clauses as "due process" and "equal protection." These cases look
into and depend upon the administration of the statute in question and
therefore have often been limited in scope to particular fact situations
which arise under specific phraseology of the statute. But in Wright
v. Matthews,17 the thirteenth amendment is applied directly to the full
scope of such a statute, making it inherently unconstitutional. The
court declares that in Virginia the inability to pay prosecution costs
is not a crime, and that a person can be imprisoned only as punishment for a crime. Imprisonment for nonpayment of prosecution costs
is therefore unconstitutional. Defendants in Virginia, at least, can
now be assured that their economic status will no longer be a factor
in the determination of their period of incarceration.
HARRY SAUNDERS

Libel and Slander-PRIVILEGE-CIA COVERT AGENT'S STATEMENT
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED. At three Estonian gatherings, defendant, National Commander of the Legion of Estonian Liberation, stated that
plaintiff was a Soviet agent or collaborator and should not receive the
Legion's cooperation during plaintiff's anti-communist film and lecture
tour of the United States." Plaintiff thereafter instituted a slander action,
alleging that defendant's statements were untrue, malicious, and defamatory. 2 Defendant asserted an absolute privilege, supported by affidavits executed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Deputy
Director These documents revealed CIA's covert employment of
17. 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968).

1. Plaintiff, a Canadian citizen, active in Estonian groups, earned a portion of his
livelihood through exhibition of "Creators of Legend," a film portraying Communist
brutalities, and by lecturing on his personal experiences as a guerilla fighter and a
Russian prisoner. Heine v. Raus, 261 F. Supp. 570, 571 (D. Md. 1966). Defendant was
overtly employed as a highway research engineer for the Office of Research and
Development, Bureau of Public Roads, United States Department of Commerce. Id.
at 572.
2. Id. at 571.

3. Id. at 572-73. A defense of absolute privilege in slander actions is a complete
immunity from liability even where actual malice is alleged; a qualified privilege is
conditional immunity, and is defeated when actual malice is shown. "The decisions
have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation upon the immunity that the official's
act must have been within the scope of his powers." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).

